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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This case concerns the relationship between the New 
Jersey Construction Lien Law and federal bankruptcy law.  
Under New Jersey law, if a supplier sells materials on credit 
to a construction contractor and the contractor incorporates 
those materials into property owned by a third party without 
paying the supplier, the supplier can file for a lien on the 
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third-party property.1  In essence, the supplier can step into 
the shoes of the contractor and collect a debt owed to the 
contractor from the third-party property owner in order to 
recoup what the contractor owes to the supplier. 
 
 The question this case presents is whether a supplier 
can file a construction lien under New Jersey law when the 
contractor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, which 
automatically stays any act to create or perfect any lien 
against the contractor’s property.  
 
 The suppliers here argue that the construction liens did 
not attach to the contractor’s accounts receivable but attached 
to the interests of the owners of the third-party properties; 
thus, creating the liens was not an act against the property of 
the bankruptcy estate.  On the other hand, the contractor 
contends that the creation of the liens was intended to collect 
the portion of the accounts receivable owed by the owners of 
the third-party properties to the contractor so that the creation 
of the liens was an act against the property of the bankruptcy 
estate.   
 
 The District Court set out in its opinion how, under 
New Jersey law, the value of the liens depended on the 
amount that the contractor owed to the suppliers under their 
contracts and on the value of the contractor’s accounts 
                                              
1 This lien is called a “construction lien” under current New 
Jersey law, but in the past, New Jersey—like many other 
states—referred to this kind of lien as a “mechanic’s lien.”  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:44A-1 et seq. (describing the New 
Jersey Construction Lien Law).  See generally 56 C.J.S. 
Mechanics’ Liens § 1 et seq. (describing mechanic’s liens). 
4 
 
receivable.  The District Court then affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court’s conclusion that the accounts receivable were part of 
the bankruptcy estate because they complied with the 
definition of property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and 
because the ability of a supplier to create a construction lien 
depended on the existence of the bankrupt contractor’s 
accounts receivable.2  For that reason, the Bankruptcy Court 
held that the automatic stay prevented filing the liens.  The 
District Court affirmed   We agree and will also affirm. 
 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
 In order to understand the events in this case, some 
review of the New Jersey Construction Lien Law and of 
bankruptcy law is helpful.   
 
1. New Jersey Construction Lien Law 
 Under New Jersey law, in general, “[a]ny contractor, 
subcontractor or supplier who provides work, services, 
material or equipment pursuant to a contract, shall be entitled 
to a lien for the value of the work or services performed, or 
materials or equipment furnished in accordance with the 
contract and based upon the contract price . . ..”3  As relevant 
here, “[t]he lien shall attach to the interest of the owner or 
unit owner of the real property development . . ..”4  The lien 
itself is “limited to the amount that [the owner] agreed in 
                                              
2 See N.J.S.A. § 2A: 44A-9. 




writing to pay, less payments made by or on behalf of that 
person in good faith prior to the filing of the lien.”5 
 
 In general, an owner discharges a lien by paying into a 
lien fund, from which claimants recover what they are owed.6  
A “claimant” is “a person having the right to file a lien claim 
on real property pursuant to [the Construction Lien Law].”7  
The claimants themselves are split into different tiers.  A 
“first tier claimant” is “a claimant who is a contractor.”8 A 
“second tier claimant” is “a claimant who is, in relation to a 
contractor: (1) a subcontractor; or (2) a supplier.”9   
 
 Numerous limitations on the lien fund and lien claims 
exist.  As relevant here, “the lien fund shall not exceed:  in the 
case of a first tier lien claimant or second tier lien claimant, 
the earned amount of the contract between the owner and the 
contractor minus any payments made prior to service of a 
copy of the lien claim . . ..”10  In addition, generally, “no lien 
fund exists, if, at the time of service of a copy of the lien 
claim, the owner or community association has fully paid the 
contractor for the work performed or for services, material or 
equipment provided.”11  Finally, each claimant’s claim is 
limited to “the unpaid portion of the contract price of the 
                                              
5 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(f). 
6 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(a) (“All lien claims established by 
judgment are valid claims that shall be concurrent and shall 
be paid as provided in subsection c. of this section.”). 
7 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-2. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(1). 
11 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(d). 
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claimant’s contract for the work, services, material or 
equipment provided.”12    
 
 In the allocation process, if there are both first and 
second tier claimants, the lien fund is allocated to first tier 
claimants “in amounts equal to their valid claims.”13  
Thereafter, “[f]rom the allocation to each first tier lien 
claimant, amounts shall be allocated equal to the valid claims 
of second tier lien claimants whose claims derive from 
contracts with that first tier lien claimant.”14  If money is left 
over in a first tier claimant’s allocation after the second tier 
claimants within that allocation are paid, then the first tier 
claimant receives the rest.15  However, if there are only 
second tier claimants, “the lien fund for second tier lien 
claimants shall be allocated in amounts equal to that second 
tier’s valid claims.”16  In any event, if the total claims exceed 
the maximum liability of the owner or the maximum 
allocation to a tier, the allocations are reduced pro rata to the 
allowable maximum.17 
 
2. Bankruptcy Law 
 A debtor in need of relief may file a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition, which commences a bankruptcy case.18  
“The commencement of a [bankruptcy] case . . . creates [a 
                                              
12 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(a). 
13 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(1). 
14 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(2).  
15 Id. 
16 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(4). 
17 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(1), (2), (4). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 301. 
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bankruptcy] estate” that generally consists of all of the 
property of the debtor.19  Filing the petition also automatically 
stays, among other things, “any act to create, perfect, or 
enforce any lien against property of the estate . . ..”20  In 
general, we interpret the breadth of the stay broadly.21 
 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Cooper Electrical Supply Co. and Samson Electrical 
Supply Co., Inc., sold electrical materials to Linear Electric 
Co., Inc., which Linear Electric incorporated into several 
construction projects.  As of July 1, 2015, the development 
owners had not fully paid Linear Electric for its work on these 
projects, and Linear Electric had not fully paid Cooper and 
Samson for their materials.22   
 
                                              
19 11 U.S.C. § 541; accord Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 
1192 (2014). 
20 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). 
21 Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 
F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2001) (“§ 541(a)’s legislative history 
demonstrates that the language of this provision was intended 
to sweep broadly . . ..”); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 
462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983) (“The House and Senate Reports 
on the Bankruptcy Code indicate that § 541(a)(1)’s scope is 
broad.”). 
22 Specifically, Linear Electric owed Cooper $1,234,100.48 
and Samson $142,980.17 for electrical materials that Linear 
Electric had purchased.  Since that time, Cooper has been 
paid $257,026.63, and Samson has been paid $15,755.54.  
They have reduced their claims accordingly. 
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 On July 1, 2015, Linear Electric filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Two weeks later, on July 15, Cooper and Samson filed 
construction liens on the developments into which Linear 
Electric had incorporated the materials that it had purchased 
from Cooper and Samson.  On July 20, Linear Electric filed a 
motion with the Bankruptcy Court to discharge the liens as 
violating the automatic stay that resulted from the bankruptcy 
petition.  On July 31, after hearing argument, the Bankruptcy 
Court granted the motion.  Linear Electric then collected the 
full amounts owed to it by the development owners.  On 
August 13, the Bankruptcy Court held that the construction 
liens were void ab initio for violation of the automatic stay.  
Linear Electric has continued to operate as a debtor-in-
possession.   
 
 Cooper and Samson appealed the Orders of the 
Bankruptcy Court of July 31 and August 13, 2015.  The 
District Court affirmed.  Cooper and Samson then appealed to 
this Court. 
II. Discussion23 
 Both parties raise procedural issues for the first time in 
this Court.  Linear Electric argues that the case is moot, and 
Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court could 
not constitutionally resolve the issue in this case in the first 
                                              
23 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and (b)(1).  The District 
Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 




instance.  We will address those issues before proceeding to 
the merits of this appeal. 
 
A. Mootness 
 When the Bankruptcy Court issued an order to 
discharge the construction liens, Cooper and Samson 
requested a stay but were not granted one.  Linear Electric 
then collected full payment from the development owners.  
Linear Electric argues that, as a result, the value of the 
constructions liens is zero.  Hence, Linear Electric concludes 
that this case is moot and subject to dismissal. 
 
 Linear Electric is correct that we generally cannot 
resolve a dispute once the dispute has become moot, even if 
mootness was not raised below (as it was not here).24  “In 
general a case becomes moot when the issues presented are 
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome.”25  Here, Cooper and Samson would have no 
cognizable interest in the liens if no money could be collected 
through them.   
 
 Furthermore, Linear Electric is correct that, under New 
Jersey law, payments from the development owners to Linear 
Electric could potentially reduce or eliminate the value that 
could be collected under the constructions liens.  However, 
such payments do not always do so, and they do not do so 
                                              
24 See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
25 Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting  United States Parole 
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)). 
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here.  In general, the value of the lien, the lien fund, and any 
claimant’s claim are all determined at the time of filing the 
lien or service of a copy of the lien claim.26  Thus, payments 
from the development owners after the filing of the lien and 
the service of a copy of the lien claim do not reduce the value 
of the lien, the lien fund, or the lien claims.   
 
 Here, Linear Electric was paid in full after the 
Bankruptcy Court decision, which came after filing and 
service occurred.  Thus, the payments to Linear Electric do 
not affect the amounts that Cooper and Samson would 
recover if the liens were proper.  As we discuss supra, Cooper 
                                              
26 See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(1) (providing that the lien 
fund shall not exceed “the earned amount of the contract 
between the owner and the contractor minus any payments 
made prior to service of a copy of the lien claim”) (emphasis 
added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(d) (“[N]o lien fund exists, if, 
at the time of service of a copy of the lien claim, the owner or 
community association has fully paid the contractor for the 
work performed or for services, material or equipment 
provided.”) (emphasis added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(f) 
(providing that the lien is “limited to the amount that [the 
owner] agreed in writing to pay, less payments made by or on 
behalf of that person in good faith prior to the filing of the 
lien”) (emphasis added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-8 (providing 
that the lien claim form subtracts “Amount Paid to Date” to 
find the “TOTAL LIEN CLAIM AMOUNT”); see also Craig 
v. Smith, 37 N.J.L. 549, 550-51 (N.J. 1875) (“to entitle the 
workman or materialman to an action against the owner, 
under the [New Jersey Mechanic’s Lien Law], there must be a 
debt due from the owner to the contractor at the time the 
notice is given”) (emphasis added). 
11 
 
and Samson, as creditors of Linear Electric, may recover 
some amount in relation to the lien amounts under the 
approved plan of liquidation.  Moreover, in its Order of 
August 13, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court, while discharging the 
liens, recognized that the “filing of the Liens shall be deemed 
to have occurred on the date of each such filing and treated as 
notices under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) for the purposes of 
determining whether (a) such Lien was timely filed under 
applicable state law and (b) any such Supplier is entitled to 
the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) or other applicable 
law.”  As a result, Cooper and Samson still have an interest in 




 Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court 
could not constitutionally enter an order invalidating the 
construction liens.  Their argument is based on the limitations 
imposed by Article III of the Constitution.  Article III vests 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States” in the judicial 
branch, the judges of which “shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.”27  Because of this clause, 
“in general, Congress may not withdraw from judicial 
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of 
a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”28  
                                              
27 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
28 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (quoting 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. 272 (1856)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Hence, courts outside the scope of Article III—that is, courts, 
such as bankruptcy courts, whose judges do not have the life 
tenure and salary protection guaranteed to Article III 
judges—cannot conclusively resolve certain state common 
law claims between private parties without the consent of 
both parties.29  However, Congress may assign cases 
involving “public rights” to non–Article III courts.30  Public 
rights cases include “cases in which the claim at issue derives 
from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of 
the claim by an expert government agency is deemed 
essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s 
authority.”31 
 
 Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court 
here, as a non–Article III court, could not resolve any claim 
regarding their construction liens, because Cooper and 
Samson describe the rights at issue with regard to the 
construction liens as private rights that are entrusted to Article 
                                              
29 Id. at 493; N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982) (holding that the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1978 was unconstitutional in part because it allowed 
bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state common law claims); 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 
(2015) (“Our precedents make clear that litigants may validly 
consent to adjudication by bankruptcy courts.”) 
30 Stern, 564 U.S. at 485. 
31 Id. at 484. 
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III courts.32  However, Linear Electric brought claims 
alleging violations of the automatic stay imposed by the filing 
of its bankruptcy.  Those claims arise under the federal 
bankruptcy laws.33  As such, any rights at issue are rights 
created by Congress, and such rights are public rights.34  
Article III does not prevent a non–Article III court from 
resolving cases regarding public rights; thus, the Bankruptcy 
                                              
32 Linear Electric argues that this argument is waived because 
Cooper and Samson did not raise this issue below.  However, 
waiver does not apply; we must consider this issue because it 
implicates the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and 
therefore our appellate jurisdiction.  See Tech. Automation 
Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 401 
(5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 
F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding sua sponte that, 
because the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, the case 
should be remanded to the bankruptcy court for dismissal); 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“defects in 
subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of 
whether the error was raised in district court”). 
33 Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 481 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (“A claim under § 362(k) for violation of the 
automatic stay is a cause of action arising under Title 11, and 
as such, a district court has jurisdiction over it.”); see also In 
re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Enjoining litigation to protect bankruptcy estates during the 
pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, unlike the entry of the 
final tort judgment at issue in Stern, has historically been the 
province of the bankruptcy courts.”). 
34 See Stern, 564 U.S. at 489 (“Congress may set the terms of 




Court could constitutionally determine whether the liens 
violated the automatic stay. 
 
C. The Construction Lien and the Automatic Stay 
 With regard to the ultimate question, whether the filing 
of the construction liens violated the automatic stay, we 
review de novo the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court 
and the District Court.35 
 
 Linear Electric filed for bankruptcy on July 1, 2015, 
which stayed any act to create or perfect a lien on Linear 
Electric’s property.36  On July 15, Cooper and Samson filed 
their construction liens—an act to perfect the liens that, 
before then, were “inchoate merely.”37  The question we 
decide here is whether filing those liens violated the 
automatic stay.  We hold that it did.  As we will explain, the 
lien claim payment process allows Cooper and Samson to 
collect their recovery by subtracting it from Linear Electric’s 
accounts receivable which are due for the value of the 
materials provided under the contracts.  Thus, Cooper and 
Samson’s lien was against Linear Electric’s property.  This 
analysis is consistent with the reasoning in numerous prior 
cases, in this Court and elsewhere, as well as with the purpose 
                                              
35 In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 136-37 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“We exercise plenary review of an order from a 
district court sitting as an appellate court in review of a 
bankruptcy court and we will review both courts’ legal 
conclusions de novo.”) 
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). 
37 Friedman v. Stein, 71 A.2d 346, 349 (N.J. 1950). 
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of the automatic stay. Cooper and Samson’s arguments to the 
contrary are unpersuasive. 
 
1. The Lien Claim Payment Process and Linear Electric’s 
Accounts Receivable 
 The lien claim payment process makes clear that 
Cooper and Samson’s liens were against Linear Electric’s 
property—specifically, its accounts receivable.  Under New 
Jersey law, if Linear Electric did not file its own lien claims 
alongside Cooper and Samson’s,38 the lien allocation would 
be as follows.  Cooper and Samson would be second tier 
claimants, and the lien fund would be allocated in amounts 
equal to their valid claims.39  Thus, Cooper and Samson 
would be fully paid, and the amount that Linear Electric is 
owed by the development owners would be reduced 
accordingly.40  That is, on its balance sheet, Linear Electric’s 
accounts receivable—which are an asset of Linear Electric—
would be reduced by the amount paid to Cooper and Samson.  
In effect, the lien claim payment process would transfer a 
                                              
38 If Linear Electric did file its own lien claims alongside 
Cooper and Samson’s, the effect would be much the same, 
with Linear Electric as a first tier claimant and Cooper and 
Samson as second tier claimants. See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-
23(c)(1)-(2). 
39 N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(4). 
40 See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-12 (“Any . . . payment [of the 
amount of a lien claim to a lien claimant] made by the owner . 
. . shall constitute a payment made on account of the contract 
price of the contract with the contractor . . . against whose 
account the lien is filed.”). 
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portion of an asset of Linear Electric to Cooper and Samson.  
Where, as here, a lien will be paid by transferring part or all 
of an asset from the bankruptcy estate to the lienholder, the 
lien is against the property of the bankruptcy estate.  Thus, 
Cooper and Samson’s filing to perfect their liens violated the 
automatic stay. 
 
2. Prior Cases and Statutory Purpose 
 Both prior cases and the purpose of the automatic stay 
support the conclusion that we reach here.  In In re Yobe 
Electric, Inc.,41 the pertinent facts were analogous:  A 
subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien, similar to the 
construction lien here, after a general contractor declared 
bankruptcy.  However, in Yobe, the subcontractor filed the 
lien under Pennsylvania law, under which the date of filing 
the mechanic’s lien related back to “the date of visible 
commencement upon the ground of the work of erecting or 
constructing the improvement.”42  Hence, the post-petition 
lien related back to a time before the petition and fell within 
an exception to the automatic stay.43   
                                              
41 728 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1984). 
42 Matter of Yobe Elec., Inc., 30 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1983) (quoting 49 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1508(a)). 
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) (“[The automatic stay is] 
subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection 
of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that 




 The bankruptcy court in Yobe, in analysis that we 
approved,44 distinguished two New Jersey cases in which 
filing a mechanic’s lien did violate the stay.45  New Jersey 
mechanic’s liens were effective as of filing, and no relation 
back applied, so the liens in those two cases were post-
petition liens and violated the stay.46  The bankruptcy court 
distinguished those cases on the basis of the different state 
laws:  Pennsylvania liens relate back, and New Jersey liens do 
not.  This distinction would have been unnecessary, however, 
if the liens were not against property of the bankruptcy estate, 
because liens that are not against property of the bankruptcy 
estate are not subject to the automatic stay.  If the liens were 
not against property of the bankruptcy estate, the New Jersey 
cases would have been wrong, not merely distinguishable, 
and the entire discussion of relation back would have been 
irrelevant. 
 
 Thus, Yobe supports the conclusion that we draw here. 
Its discussion implies that the liens were against the property 
of the bankruptcy estate, and it suggests that construction or 
mechanic’s liens that do not fall within an exception to the 
                                              
44 We affirmed in a short opinion “on the basis of the well-
reasoned opinion of the bankruptcy judge.”  Yobe, 728 F.2d at 
208. 
45 See Matter of Valairco, Inc., 9 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1981); In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 18 
B.R. 643 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982). 
46 Yobe, 30 B.R. at 117-18. 
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automatic stay by, for example, relating back to a pre-petition 
time—as the liens here do not47—violate the automatic stay.48 
 
 Also supporting our conclusion are numerous cases 
from other courts that have considered enforcement (rather 
than creation or perfection) of mechanic’s liens in similar 
factual circumstances.  In all of these cases, courts have either 
held or assumed that the liens are against the bankruptcy 
                                              
47 Since Yobe, New Jersey has repealed the Mechanic’s Lien 
Law and replaced it with the Construction Lien Law.  
However, no party has suggested, and we cannot find any 
reason to believe, that any of the changes in the statute affect 
the outcome of the case.  For example, none of the changes 
would make the liens relate back to a time before their filing. 
48 The exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 
546(b)(1) is broader than relation back, see In re 229 Main St. 
Ltd. P’ship, 262 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2001), but the 
exception does not apply here in any event.  The exception 
generally provides that “if an interest holder against whom 
the trustee would have rights still has, under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, and as of the date of the petition, the 
opportunity to perfect his lien against an intervening interest 
holder, then he may perfect his interest against the trustee.”  
In re Grede Foundries, Inc., 651 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890, 
891-92 (3d Cir.1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  




estate’s property interests.49  We agree:  The liens here were 
against Linear Electric’s interests in property. 
 
 Finally, the purpose of the automatic stay supports our 
conclusion.  In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy such as Linear 
Electric’s, a debtor proposes a plan of repayment “which 
divides claims against the debtor into separate ‘classes’ and 
specifies the treatment each class will receive.”50  A plan 
typically specifies that at least some creditors will receive less 
than the full value that they were originally owed, because a 
bankrupt entity generally has inadequate assets to cover its 
liabilities.  A court will approve such a plan, even over the 
objections of the creditors, “if the plan does not discriminate 
unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class 
                                              
49 See, e.g., In re Hunters Run Ltd. P’ship, 875 F.2d 1425, 
1427 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the argument that a 
mechanic’s lien “is not ‘against the debtor’ but is instead 
‘against the realty or security for the debt’”); In re Baldwin 
Builders, 232 B.R. 406, 412-13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that post-petition commencement of a mechanic’s 
lien foreclosure action by a subcontractor violates the 
automatic stay from a general contractor’s bankruptcy 
petition); In re Concrete Structures, Inc., 261 B.R. 627, 643 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (rejecting the argument that “a suit to enforce 
a mechanic’s lien is an action in rem” rather than “against the 
debtor”); In re Richardson Builders, Inc., 123 B.R. 736, 741 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990) (“[W]hen a general contractor files a 
bankruptcy petition, [§] 362(a) stays the filing and 
prosecution of mechanic’s lien enforcement actions by 
subcontractors.”). 
50 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 
S. Ct. 2065, 2069 (2012). 
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of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not 
accepted, the plan.”51  The purpose of the automatic stay is to 
give breathing room for the development of such a plan.52   
 
 Here, if Cooper and Samson were allowed to receive 
full repayment via New Jersey’s Construction Lien Law, they 
would be fully repaid, and Linear Electric would receive less 
as a result.  Thus, there would be less total money to go into 
the plan of repayment, and other creditors of Linear Electric 
would suffer.  Cooper and Samson would be effectively 
circumventing the bankruptcy case in order to unfairly 
advantage themselves at the expense of other creditors.  For 
better or for worse, the automatic stay requires that Cooper 
and Samson wait as Linear Electric’s bankruptcy case 
proceeds and receive whatever they will receive under 
bankruptcy law without resort to other mechanisms to claim 
greater payments.  
 
3. Cooper and Samson’s Arguments 
 Cooper and Samson argue that their liens did not 
violate the automatic stay because the liens attached to the 
property interests of the development owners and did not 
                                              
51 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).  
52 In re VistaCare Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[The automatic stay’s] primary purpose was to give 
the debtor a ‘breathing spell’ from creditors, to allow the 
debtor to begin the process of discharging his debts, and 




attach to the interests of Linear Electric.53  Therefore, they 
conclude, the liens were proper.  However, their argument is 
not persuasive.  First of all, we agree with the cogent 
reasoning of the District Court that liens were against Linear 
Electric’s accounts receivable.  Futhermore, the stay applies 
to any lien “against” Linear Electric’s interests in property, 
not solely those that “attach” to Linear Electric’s interests in 
property,54 and the Construction Lien Law expressly 
contemplates that a lien may be against something to which it 
does not attach.  For example, it refers to “the contractor or 
subcontractor against whose account the lien is filed . . ..”55  
Hence, the text of the Construction Lien Law provides no 
reason to believe that the liens are not also against Linear 
Electric’s accounts receivable (in addition to attaching to the 
development owners’ real property interests). 
 
                                              
53 See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(a) (providing that a construction 
lien “shall attach to the interest of the owner or unit owner of 
the real property development”).  Cooper and Samson 
contrast this wording with New Jersey’s Municipal 
Mechanic’s Lien Law, which allows public contractors to file 
a lien upon “moneys” of the public agency that hired the 
contractor under circumstances similar to those in which a 
private contractor could file a construction lien.  See N.J. S. 
A. § 2A:44-128(a). 
54 “Attach” and “against” are not synonyms.  Compare 
Black’s Law Dictionary 152 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“attach”) with Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
(11th ed.), available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/against (defining “against”). 
55 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:44A-12 (emphasis added). 
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 Cooper and Samson also argue that their liens may not 
have been against Linear Electric’s interests in property 
because Linear Electric may have had no interests in the debts 
from the development owners.  Cooper and Samson suggest 
that the contracts between Linear Electric and the 
development owners, which were never submitted into 
evidence, may have provided that Linear Electric’s paying its 
suppliers was a condition precedent to Linear Electric’s right 
to repayment for its construction work.  Cooper and Samson 
allege that such a provision is standard throughout the 
industry.  They argue that if this provision were part of the 
contract, then Linear Electric would have no property interest 
in anything from the development owners, so the liens would 
not violate the automatic stay.  Hence, they request a remand 
for contract interpretation.  However, their argument is 
mistaken on a crucial point of law.  New Jersey’s 
Construction Lien Law provides that the value of the lien 
fund cannot exceed the amount that the owner actually owed 
the contractor at the time of filing or service.56  Thus, if the 
contract provides as Cooper and Samson have suggested and 
if, as a result, Linear Electric has no right to repayment from 
the development owners, then the value of the lien fund is 
zero.  In such circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court would 
have been correct to order the liens discharged.  Cooper and 
Samson therefore have provided no reason to remand this 
case. 
                                              
56 See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(1) (providing that the lien 
fund shall not exceed “the earned amount of the contract 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
